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I. INTRODUCTION

On December 11, 2002, the appellate panel of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) unanimously ruled that war
correspondents cannot be compelled to testify, except under certain
circumstances. In quashing a trial court order to former Washington
Post reporter Jonathan Randal to testify about the veracity of his 1993
interview with former Bosnian Serb leader Radoslav Brdjanin, the ICTY
set out a two-pronged test for subpoenaing war correspondents: first, that
the evidence must be of "direct and important value in determining a
core issue in the case," and second, the evidence sought "cannot
reasonably be obtained elsewhere."' The decision marked the first, and
only, time an international war crimes tribunal had definitively ruled on
the issue of journalistic privilege.
The ICTY's decision in Prosecutorv. Brdjanin was a clear victory for
the media and generally is regarded as a significant recognition of press
freedom in combat areas.2 Especially notable is the potential breadth of
the privilege recognized by the ICTY. International and municipal
courts previously had held that a journalist cannot be compelled, except
in extraordinary circumstances, to reveal identities and information
given in confidence. 3 Yet Randal's subpoena was for far less sensitive
information, requiring only that he verify quotes and information clearly
attributed to Brdjanin and published in a widely-read newspaper. The
Brdjanin decision goes further than any other decision regarding
journalistic privilege in that it allows journalists to invoke the privilege

1. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin & Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-AR73.9,
50 (ICTY
Appeals Chamber Dec. 11, 2002) [hereinafter Brdjanin Appeals Chamber Opinion]. The
appellate panel was made up of five judges from France, Guyana, Turkey, Sri Lanka, and
the United States.
2. See Marlise Simons, U.N. Court Grants Special Legal Protection to War
Reporters, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 12, 2002, at A10; Stephanie Van Den Berg, U.N.Court
Recognizes War Correspondent's Right to Silence, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 11,
2002.
3. See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17488/90, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123,
46 (1996) (ordering journalist to reveal the source of a confidential company document
in violation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Civil and Political Rights);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). The U.S.
Supreme Court refused to recognize an absolute privilege for journalists, but Justice
Powell's concurring opinion offered a narrowing construction recognizing a qualified
privilege for when the information sought is "remote and tenuous" to the subject of the
investigation or when the testimony would compromise a "confidential source
relationship without a legitimate need of law enforcement." Today, thirty-one states and
the District of Columbia have common law or statutory "shield law" protections for
reporters. See infra note 64.
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purely on the basis of their status as journalists, even if confidential
information and/or sources are not involved.
With the recent commencement of investigatory actions by the
International Criminal Court4 (ICC) and the significant media presence
in several conflict areas, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, it is virtually
certain that international criminal tribunals will again need to balance the
unique role of the press in war against other interests, such as prosecuting
war criminals and preserving the rights of defendants. Brdjanin provides
substantial guidance, yet a myriad of ambiguities and unresolved issues
surrounding a journalist's wartime testimonial privilege remain. First,
with the ease of international travel and communications (particularly
the internet), it is increasingly difficult to define what kind of journalist
should benefit from a qualified testimonial privilege. Secondly, the
ICTY provided little guidance for applying its two-pronged test to
compel reporter testimony. This ambiguity stands in stark contrast to the
detailed, codified protections that the international tribunals recognize
for certain privileged professional communications and, in particular,
observations and information gathered by officers and employees of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Lastly, even while
the ICC may adopt the holding and reasoning of the ICTY decision the
next time it is confronted with a journalist who refuses to testify, it is not
bound to follow such case law. 6

4. The stated mission of the International Criminal Court is to prosecute persons
charged with the most serious violations of international law, including war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide. It has jurisdiction for offenses committed after
July 1, 2002 on the territory of a state which has ratified the treaty, by a citizen of such a
state, or on referral by the United Nations Security Council. See Rome Statute of the
Int'l Crim. Ct., July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, available at http://www.
un.org/icc. The United States is not a party to the treaty. The ICC opened its first investigations
in 2004. See ICC, Situationsand Cases, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.html.
5. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the Int'l Crim. Ct., Nov. 2, 2000,
U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/l/Add. 1, available at httpJIww.icc-cpi.int/libray/about/officiajouma/
basicdocuments/rules(e).pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2005). Rule 73(3) gives specific recognition
to privileged communications between persons and their legal counsel, doctor, or clergy.
Subsections (4), (5), and (6) lay out a detailed privilege for ICRC officials and
employees. In general, ICRC members enjoy complete immunity from testimony. The
ICTY recognized an absolute privilege for Red Cross and Red Crescent workers in
Prosecutor v. Simic, Ex Parte Confidential Decision on the Prosecution Motion under
Rule 73 for a Ruling Concerning the Testimony of a Witness, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 73
(ICTY Trial Chamber 1999).
6.
While international tribunals often cite their own decisions and those of other
international and municipal courts in their rulings, there is no per se concept of stare
decisis in international law. For an example of the evidentiary value ofjudicial decisions

This article argues that given the unique and significant contribution
of journalists to uncovering and documenting war crimes, the ICC
should amend its evidentiary rules to recognize a qualified journalist's
privilege. In doing so, the ICC should clearly identify who may benefit
from such a privilege, clarify a procedure for balancing the need of
reportorial testimony against prosecution and defense interests, and,
lastly, provide for mandatory consultations between the court and
affected news organizations or journalists before allowing the issuance
of a subpoena. Such clarity will benefit not only journalists working in
war zones and the ICC, but will provide guidance for future ad hoc
international tribunals.
Part II of this paper will examine the role of journalists in war zones,
discuss the Brdjanin case, and consider the challenges of codifying a
qualified privilege for reporters working in conflict areas. Part III will
analyze the difficulties of defining a journalist. Part IV will examine the
municipal and international law bases for recognizing a journalists'
privilege and the effects of conflicting legal interests on such a privilege.
As a comparison to journalist's privilege, it will consider codified
testimonial privileges that are extended by the ICC to traditional
confidential communications (such as doctor-patient and priest-penitent)
and officials and members of the ICRC. Part V will address the moral
dilemmas in granting a journalist protection from testimony in the
setting of a war crimes tribunal. Part VI will conclude with a proposed
procedural rule for adoption by the ICC.
II. THE WAR CORRESPONDENT'S ROLE AND THE BRDJANIN CASE
A. The War Correspondent
Because journalists are trained to be neutral observers, they are not
only well-suited to report on armed conflicts, but also to serve as
valuable witnesses in subsequent criminal prosecutions. In addition to
their investigative work, high profile news organizations and reporters
working in war-torn countries are sometimes sought out by witnesses to
war crimes, and even suspected war criminals themselves, who wish to
take advantage of their reach. In a circumstance where the journalist
becomes privy to information later deemed critical to a war prosecution,
this combination of influence and access can lead to a legal and moral
Hobson's Choice. Some journalists will feel obligated to testify in the
interests of justice, while others will contend that testifying puts not only
as customary international law in international tribunals, see Statute of the Int'l Ct. of
Justice, June 26, 1945, arts. 38 and 59, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, availableat http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm.
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themselves and other journalists at risk for retaliation, but also degrades
the position of a reporter as a neutral observer, thus hampering their
ability to report from war zones. This latter category of journalists argue
that testifying in court, even merely to facts observed, transforms them
into agents of the prosecution, supporters of criminal defendants, or-in
the case of civil matters-advocates for one side or the other. They
believe that witnesses and sources will be reluctant to speak with them if
they believe that their comments will end up not only in a news report,
but as evidence in a trial.
To illustrate how a reporter can be in a prime position to uncover and
investigate a potential war crime, consider this hypothetical situation.
An American television reporter in Iraq receives a tip that coalition
soldiers 7 methodically shot and killed several Iraqi children at close
range. The reporter first calls a military official and is told there was an
incident involving some Iraqi children, but that a bomb planted by terrorists
is to blame. The reporter heads out to the scene and, after determining that
no other journalists, aid workers, or military representatives are present,
begins to interview witnesses. One man, whom the reporter believes is
the most reliable eyewitness, claims that around 3 a.m. a group of coalition
soldiers patrolling Sadr City, a Baghdad slum, stopped a car carrying a
family of five and began firing. Three children and their father were
killed.
At the police station, the reporter talks his way into seeing the car-which
the Iraqi police say they plan to destroy by the end of the day. It is
pockmarked with very large holes and a policeman tells him that more
than one hundred bullets were removed from the vehicle. The reporter
then speaks with a coalition soldier who says the incident was an
accident-that the soldiers only opened fire because the car was too
close to a military Humvee and the father ignored orders to stop. The
next stop is the hospital, where the wife, who was sitting in the front seat
of the car, is recovering from several gunshot wounds. Still in shock,
she pours out her version of the night's events through an interpreter:
that her family was driving close to the Humvee for safety and that they
turned on the interior light so the soldiers would see that only children
7. As mentioned in supra note 4, the United States is not a party to the Rome
Treaty. However, other coalition nations-such as the United Kingdom-are. U.S.
officials have maintained that the court does not have sufficient safeguards to prevent
U.S. troops from being the target of politically motivated prosecutions. Iraq is not a

signatory to the treaty.

were inside. Then she begins wailing. A crowd starts to form in her room
and begins shouting out different versions of the story; some contend the
soldiers never said anything before firing, others maintain the soldiers
yelled racial epithets at the family and gleefully began shooting. The
reporter leaves and returns to the scene, which the U.S. military has now
cordoned off.
This reporter may find himself at the nexus of competing interests. A
war crimes tribunal might wish to investigate whether the soldiers
committed a crime by intentionally firing on unarmed civilians. Conversely,
the involved soldiers may want the correspondent's testimony to support
their contention that they fired by mistake and out of reasonable caution.
From the reporter's point of view, he may be concerned that by
appearing before a criminal tribunal he will lose his access to sources,
and more importantly, become a target. By the time such a case goes
before an international tribunal, the car at issue will have been destroyed
and eyewitness testimony-tainted by hysteria and/or self-interest-may
have morphed into an indecipherable Rashomon-like stew. The reporter
is the only uninvolved party who has seen all the evidence, spoken to all
the parties, and taken the eyewitness statements. Should he or she be
forced to testify? What if the reporter does a story on the incident--can
he or she be forced to go before a court to confirm details or to provide
more information? 8 These were some of the central questions in the
recent controversy surrounding a decision by an ITCY trial court 9 to
force former Washington Post reporter Jonathan Randal to testify at the
genocide trial of Serbian official Radoslav Brdjanin.

8. This hypothetical is loosely based on an American reporter's experience while
reporting on the Iraq war. In a high-profile incident raising similar questions, Kevin
Sites, a freelance cameraman working for NBC in Iraq in late 2004, filmed a U.S.
Marine killing a wounded Iraqi in Falluja mosque. Sites, who was embedded with the
Marine unit, was the only journalist who witnessed the incident and has written a firstperson account of what he saw. See Kevin Sites, Wat happened in the FallujahMosque,
MSNBC NEWS, Nov. 22, 2004, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ id/6556034/.
Human rights groups (including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) called
for an investigation into whether the shooting was a war crime. At the time of
publication, the matter was still under investigation by the U.S. military. See Anthony
Shadid, U.S. Commander in Iraq Calls Shooting 'Tragic,' WASH. POST., Nov. 17, 2004,
at A15.
9. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). The
U.N. Security Council, acting under its Chapter VII powers, which authorize it to take
enforcement measures to "maintain or restore international peace and security," created
the ICTY in 1993. Its mandate is to prosecute persons "responsible for serious violations
of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia
between 1 January 1991 and a date to be determined by the Security Council."
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B. The Brdjanin Case
At issue in the case was Randal's 1993 interview with Brdjanin, part
of which was used in an article l ° on the forced expulsion of non-Serbs
from their homes. Brdjanin was quoted as saying that he was preparing
to expel non-Serbs from government housing in the Banja Luka region
of Bosnia and that an "exodus" of non-Serbs was necessary to "create an
ethnically clean space through voluntary movement.""
Randal initially cooperated with United Nations prosecutors. In
August 2001, he voluntarily gave a statement about his interview, but
maintained that the article should speak for itself and said he would not
12
After
appear in court to testify about the accuracy of its contents.

prosecutors attempted to introduce the article into evidence during a pretrial conference in January 2002, Brdjanin's attorneys objected on the
3
ground that, inter alia, the article was inadmissible hearsay.' Prosecutors
Randal
attempted to call Randal to testify as to contents
1 4 of the article.

refused and swiftly was served with a subpoena.

10. Jonathan C. Randal, Preservingthe Fruitsof Ethnic Cleansing;Bosnian Serbs,
Expulsion Victims See Process as Beyond Reversal, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1993, at A34.
11. Id.
12. Prosecutorv. Brdianin & Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-AR73.9, 1 28 (ICTY Trial
Chamber June 7, 2002) [hereinafter Brdianin Trial Chamber I Opinion]. See also Roy
Gutman, Consequences occur when Reporters Testify, NIEMAN REP., Spring 2003, at 7475. Gutman explains that ICTY investigators routinely seek interviews with journalists
about articles that have appeared in print. Discussions between investigators and
journalists, which address the interview's context and subject's demeanor, are then
written up in a memo and the journalist is asked to sign it. Randal reportedly admitted
signing a memo recounting his debriefing, but claimed that he was not told it would be
used in court or that he would be asked to testify as to its contents. Randal, supra note
10.
13. Brdjanin Trial Chamber I Opinion, supra note 12, at T 1. See also Transcript
of Proceedings at 5406-5407, 5411-5412, Prosecutor v. Brdjanin & Talic, Case No. IT99-36-AR73.9 (ICTY Trial Chamber III May 10, 2002) [hereinafter Brdjanin Trial
Chamber Opinion III]. Prosecutors insisted that Brdjanin's comments in the article went
"directly to the heart of this case," since they evidenced a motive "to rid the territory of
the non-Serbian population." Prosecutors said they would have been content simply to
enter the article into evidence and refrain from calling Randal to testify. However,
Brdjanin's lawyers argued that the article might be inaccurate because Randal used an
interpreter during his interview with the Serb leader. Under rule 70(E) of the ICTY's
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, a defendant has the right to challenge evidence
presented by the prosecution, unless the information had been provided directly to the
prosecution under an agreement of confidentiality. In the Brdjanin case, prosecutors did
not contest that the defendant had a right to challenge the veracity of Randal's article.
14. S.C. Resolution 827, supra note 9, calls upon "all states... to take any
measures necessary under their domestic law to implement the provisions [of 827 and
the statute of the ICTY], including the obligation of states to comply with requests for

In denying Randal's motion to set aside the subpoena, the ICTY trial
court agreed with Randal's contention that "[j]ournalists reporting on
conflict areas play a vital role in bringing to the attention of the
international community the horrors and reality of the conflict." But the
panel concluded that the ICTY request would not endanger Randal's
objectivity, independence, or effectiveness since he only was being
asked to testify about information already released to the public. "The
objectivity and independence of journalists, and the media that publish
their articles or reports, cannot be taken for granted a priorias Randal's
argument would have it," the court wrote. "No journalist can expect or
claim that once she or he has decided to publish no one has a right to
15
question their report or question them on it.:
In seeking a reversal of the trial court's decision to enforce the
subpoena, Randal argued to the ICTY's appeals panel that a qualified
privilege for journalists-which would include a presumption against
testifying about published materials-is necessary to safeguard a
journalist's ability "to investigate and report effectively from areas in
which war crimes take place."' 6 Randal cited Rule 73 of the ICC, 17
8
Article 79 of the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Convention,
assistance or orders issued by a Trial Chamber under Article 29 [of the ICTY statute]."
Article 29 describes five potential requests for assistance by a trial chamber, including,
but not limited to:
(a) the identification and location of persons;
(b) the taking of testimony and the production of evidence;
(c) the service of documents;
(d) the arrest or detention of persons;
(e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal.
Id. Under French law adopted pursuant to S.C. Resolution 827, France commits to
extensive judicial assistance to the ICTY and its Prosecutor. Law No. 95-1 of Jan. 2,
1995, J.O., Jan. 3, 1995, p. 71. The United States has not adopted a law pursuant to S.C.
Resolution 827, but rather has promulgated an agreement between itself and the tribunal.
In it, the United States agrees to surrender, provisionally arrest, or transport persons
"charged with or found guilty of a violation or violations within the competence of the
Tribunal." It does not include a provision for cooperation. Agreement on Surrender of
Persons between the Government of the United States and the International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia, Oct. 5, 1994, T.I.A.S. No.
12,570, 32 I.L.M. 1159. Randal, a U.S. citizen, resides in France, thus he was more
vulnerable to being forced to comply with the ICTY's subpoena than had he been
residing in the United States. Randal, supra note 10.
15. Brdjanin Trial Chamber I Opinion, supra note 12, 26.
16. Id. 11.
17. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 5.
18. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978). One
hundred sixty-two countries are parties to Protocol I. A complete list of the signatory
states is available at Int'l Humanitarian Law, States Parties & Signatories, at http://www.
icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebNORM?OpenView&Start= &Count=-150&Collapse=52.1 #52.1 (last
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9
in Goodwin,'
the European Court on Human Rights' (ECHR) decision

as well as U.S. judicial and administrative directives as support for a
qualified privilege for journalists. 20 He urged the panel to adopt a five-

visited Jan. 17, 2005). The Protocol provides certain measures of protection for
journalists:
I.
Journalists engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas of armed
conflict shall be considered as civilians within the meaning of Article 50,
paragraph 1.
They shall be protected as such under the Conventions and this Protocol,
2.
provided that they take no action adversely affecting their status as civilians,
and without prejudice to the right of war correspondents accredited to the
armed forces to the status provided for in Article 4 A (4) of the Third
Convention.
They may obtain an identity card similar to the model in Annex II of this
3.
Protocol. This card, which shall be issued by the government of the State of
which the journalist is a national or in whose territory he resides or in which
the news medium employing him is located, shall attest to his status as a
journalist.
Id. at art. 79.
19. Goodwin, supra note 3, 39. The ECHR in Goodwin specifically recognized
a public interest role of journalists and supported the idea of a qualified privilege for
journalists who seek to protect the identity of sources. The court grounded its reasoning
in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter 1950
Convention on Human Rights]. Article 10 reads, in pertinent part:
I. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers....
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities,
2.
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests
of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of
the reputation of the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.
20. See Branzburg, supra note 3, at 665. For information on the U.S. Department
of Justice policy with regard to the issuance of subpoenas to members of the news media,
subpoenas for telephone toll records of members of the news media, and the interrogation,
indictment, or arrest of members of the news media, see 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2004). The
policy statement for § 50.10 reads: "Because freedom of the press can be no broader than
the freedom of reporters to investigate and report the news, the prosecutorial power of
the government should not be used in such a way that it impairs a reporter's responsibility to
cover as broadly as possible controversial public issues." The guidelines require, inter
alia, that "all reasonable attempts" be made to obtain the information from alternative
sources before considering the issuance of a subpoena, that negotiations with the media
"be pursued in all cases in which a subpoena to a member of the news media is
contemplated," and that any subpoena issued to a member of the news media must be
expressly authorized by the Attorney General.

part test, asserting that a subpoena should be issued only if the trial court
determines that:
[T]he compelled journalist's testimony would provide admissible evidence that:
(1) is "of crucial importance" to determining a defendant's guilt or innocence;
(2) cannot be obtained "by any other means or from any other witness;" (3) will
not require the journalist to breach any obligation or confidence; (4) will not
place the journalist, his family, or his sources in reasonably apprehended
danger; and (5) will not serve as a precedent that will "unnecessarily jeopardize
the effectiveness or safety of other journalists reporting from that conflict zone
'21
in the future.

Thirty-four media organizations filed a brief as Amici Curiae, voicing
the same general concerns as Randal: that forcing journalists to testify
against their own sources, "confidential or otherwise," would turn journalists
from observers of conflict to participants and thus undermine their
ability to uncover and report the news. The group proposed a far less
stringent test, arguing that a subpoena should not be issued unless the
court determines that the testimony: "(1) is absolutely essential to the
case; and (2) the information cannot be obtained by any other means.' 2 2
The Amici Curiae argued that the test for whether information was
"absolutely essential" should be whether it is "critical to determining the
guilt of innocence of a defendant., 23 Furthermore, the group argued:
"The burden therefore falls upon the party seeking the subpoena, not
upon the reporter, to show that it exhausted all other available avenues
24

of obtaining information.'
In its decision to overturn the subpoena, the Appeals Chamber parsed
the Randal issue into three subsidiary questions: (1) whether there is a
public interest in the work of war correspondents; (2) if yes, whether
compelling war correspondents to testify before a tribunal would adversely
affect their ability to work; and (3) if yes, what test is appropriate to
balance the public interest in accommodating the work of war
correspondents with "the public interest in having all relevant evidence
available to the court and, where it is implicated, the right of the
defendant to challenge the evidence against him?" 25 The court answered
the first two questions in the affirmative. As to the first question, the
panel explained that "a vigorous press is essential to the functioning of
open societies and that a too frequent and easy resort to compelled

21. Brdjanin Appeals Chamber Opinion, supra note 1,
15. The first two
questions in Randal's proposal are clearly derived from U.S. state court tests for the
reporter's privilege.
22. Brief of Amici Curiae on Behalf of Various Media Entities 43, Brdjanin
Appeals Chamber Opinion, supra note 1.
23. Id. 44.
24. Id. 45.
25. Brdjanin Appeals Chamber Opinion, supra note 1, 34.
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production of evidence by journalists may, in certain circumstances,
26
Its answer to the
hinder their ability to gather and report the news.
second question was more tentative; the court explained that it was
difficult to quantify the extent to which compelling war correspondents
to testify would actually hurt their ability to work. Still, the court held
that "compelling war correspondents to testify before the International

Tribunal on a routine basis may have a significant impact upon their
ability to obtain information and thus their ability to inform the public
on issues of general concern., 27 As to the third question, the appeals
panel refrained from adopting the tests proffered by Randal and Amici
Curiae and devised its own two-part balancing test, holding that
subpoenas to war correspondents may be issued only when the
petitioning party can, first, "demonstrate that the evidence sought is of
direct and important value in determining a core issue in the case" and,
second, "demonstrate that the evidence cannot reasonably be obtained

elsewhere.

28

III.

DEFINING THE PROFESSION

The threshold issue in articulating a qualified journalistic privilege
that should prevail in the ICC and other international tribunals is
29
defining exactly who is a 'journalist." This is not a simple task. In
26.

Id. 35.

27.

Id.

44.

28. Id. 50. Randal's five part test was rejected outright as an impermissible
absolute privilege. The Amici Curiae proposal fared much better, although it was
substantially softened.
29. See Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism

to Protect the Journalist'sPrivilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 Hous. L.
REV. 1371, 1374 (2003). Within the context of trying to articulate a statutory journalist's
privilege, Berger explains the difficulty in trying to distinguish the "protected from the
unprotected." "[T]he limitation itself may violate the First Amendment principle of
neutrality by favoring one kind of speaker, one kind of content, or one medium of
communication over all others." Id. See also Branzburg, supra note 3, at 703-04. The
court noted the practical difficulties of creating a First Amendment privilege for
journalists:
The administration of a constitutional newsman's privilege would present
practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order. Sooner or later, it would
be necessary to define those categories of newsmen who qualified for the
privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the traditional doctrine that
liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon
paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher who
utilizes the latest photocomposition methods. ... Freedom of the press is a
'fundamental personal right' which 'is not confined to newspapers and periodicals.

most Western countries, there are no universal standards for joining the
journalism profession-no required degrees, no entrance exam, no
mandatory organizational membership. 30 While many working journalists
have a current or prior association with an established news gathering
organization, there are countless persons who work either alone or
tangentially with news organizations as stringers, freelancers, independent
authors, and bloggers. 31 The evident problem with trying to confer a
privilege on such a loosely-defined profession is finding a balance
between covering all those who could and should benefit from such a
privilege, while at the same time excluding those who would seek to
wrap themselves in the privilege simply to avoid their duty to testify. In
Brdjanin, the ICTY specifically narrowed its holding to "war
correspondents," which it described as "individuals who, for any period
of time, report (or investigate for the purposes of reporting) from a
conflict zone on issues relating to the conflict., 32 But such a definition
may be under-inclusive. While it appears to include the well-known TV
or newspaper correspondent reporting from a conflict zone, it is unclear
whether it covers the people for whom they work. As a matter of good
It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. ... The press in its historic
connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of
information and opinion.'... The informative function asserted by
representatives of the organized press in the present cases is also performed by
lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists.
Almost any author may quite accurately assert that he is contributing to the
flow of information to the public, that he relies on confidential sources of
information, and that these sources will be silenced if he is forced to make
disclosures before a grand jury.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
30. In most Westernized countries, requiring journalists to meet state-set criteria is
viewed as an impermissible prior restraint on free expression. Some countries, generally
those with authoritarian regimes, require journalists to register with the government. In a
landmark 1985 ruling, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights issued an advisory
opinion finding that a press licensing scheme in Costa Rica restricted freedom of
expression, in violation of Article 13(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights,
because it allowed the state to determine how individuals seek, impart, and receive
information. It was the first time an international human rights court had held that
mandatory licensing of journalists violates human rights provisions. Adv. Op. OC-5/85,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985). The European Court of Human Rights also has ruled
that licensing systems for media, with the exception of ones designed for purely
technical matters, are illegitimate. See Gaweda v. Poland,2002 Eur. Ct. H.R. 301.
31. A stringer is a person who acts as a professional information-source for a
reporter. Freelancers are journalists who sell their work on a project basis and who are
not permanently associated with a news organization. Bloggers maintain Internet
websites--either independently or in conjunction with a more established media entityon which they post their own news reporting and commentary, as well as links to other
Internet-published works.
32. Brdjanin Appeals Chamber Opinion, supra note 1, 29. It is noteworthy, and
will be discussed infra, that the ICTY's use of the term "war correspondent" differs from
its use in Geneva Conventions.
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journalistic practice, reporters often confide in their editors or supervisors
the source of their news, as well as any contextual or background
information deemed necessary by the editor or supervisor to ensure the
validity and veracity of the report. Thus, to exclude editors and supervisors
from a journalist's privilege essentially would vitiate any privilege
recognized for a reporter. And what of the lone writer who travels to a
conflict zone in the hopes of finding material for a book or for
dispatches to his Internet site? If he comes into the possession of
information deemed valuable to an international tribunal, should he be
forced to testify? An ICC panel seeking information from a reporter that
doesn't fit the ICTY's description of a "war correspondent" may well be
faced with such questions.
To understand the amorphous professional landscape of journalism, it
is helpful to think of the profession as a broad spectrum encompassing a
wide swath of standards, protocols, and goals. At one end of the spectrum
are those whom most people would think of as reporters-individuals
who gather news, which is then vetted by editors and disseminated
through an established news outlet (newspaper, internet, television, or
radio), which may be either independent 33 (such as The New York Times
or CNN) or government-funded (such as the British and Canadian
Broadcasting Companies). Journalists who work for news outlets must
adhere to these organizations' codified standards of news reporting
conduct and subject their work to the scrutiny of editors. These editors,
who also occupy this area of the spectrum, are charged with vetting and
sanctioning the material that appears on their news outlet. Similarly,
media executives, though not engaged themselves in collecting and
disseminating news, can be held responsible for materials published
under their auspices. 34 Ultimately, the work of these journalists, editors,
33. The term "independent" in this context refers to financial independence.
While news organizations such as the British and Canadian Broadcasting Companies
receive government funding, they are not under the editorial control of the government.
34. News media executives have been criminally convicted by international courts
for inciting crimes against humanity. In October 1946, Nazi publisher Julius Streicher
was sentenced to hang by the Nurbemberg Tribunals for his role in inciting hatred
against the Jews. In late 2003, the U.N. ad hoc tribunal prosecuting war crimes in
Rwanda (ICTR) convicted three Rwandan news media executives of genocide for
inciting a killing spree by Hutus against Tutsis in early 1994. The three were sentenced
to lengthy prison terms. Critics of the convictions have maintained that verdicts that
punish speech inevitably infringes on press freedom. See Dina Temple-Raston,
Journalism and Genocide, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., Sept./Oct. 2002, at 18-19; Stephen
Kinzer, In Rwandan Genocide, Words Were Killers, Too, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 7, 2003, at 4-3.

and executives is inextricably intertwined with the reputation of the
news organization with which they are associated and, in turn, a news
organization builds on the collective works of its employees to gather
access and influence. Closely related, but distinctly different from those
charged with gathering and reporting the news, are commentators and
analysts who are not held to standards of objectivity. News outlets often
utilize commentators and analysts to add depth or variety to straight
news coverage by either presenting alternative points of view on a given
subject or using their expertise to explain complicated stories.
At the opposite end of this spectrum are individuals who work as sole
practitioners, either as stringers or freelancers who collect and produce
reportage, commentary, or analysis to be sold to media organizations or
to be used in a non-traditional news outlet or book. This is an incredibly
difficult field to navigate; 35 because of the lack of any common
credential or licensing, there really is nothing to stop the individual who
writes an article and posts it on the Internet, or in a self-published
newsletter, from calling himself or herself a journalist. A journalist working
alone does not necessarily benefit from the safety net of established
standards and editors to enforce those standards. Additionally, support
staff that arrange interviews and provide translation services and travel
logistics must also be considered. Such individuals will be privy to a
journalist's information and sources and, like a reporter's editor, must be
immunized from being used as an end-run around a journalist's privilege.
A. Journalistsin InternationalHumanitarianLaw
The dilemma of identifying "who is a journalist" has been the subject
of much debate in international law, particularly within the context of
armed conflicts-international humanitarian law has long struggled to
distinguish journalists from the rest of the civilian population during
wartime. Some of the earliest recognition of journalists as a distinct
class of persons in international humanitarian law can be found in
Article 13 of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War,
appended to The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 190736 and the Geneva
35. See Robert D. Lystad & Malena F. Barzilai, Reporter's Privilege: Legislative
and Regulatory Developments, in Media Law Res. Ctr., White Paper on the Reporter's
Privilege, MEDIA L. RESOURCE CTR. BULLETIN, Aug. 2004, at 97. The authors note that
in deciding whether to apply shield laws to freelance journalists, courts generally focus
on: (1) whether the freelancer is in a formal arrangement with a media entity or (2)
whether the information was gathered with an intent to publish.
36. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July
29, 1899, Annex, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403; Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539. Art. 13
reads:
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Convention of 27 July 1929 Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War.37 Under these instruments, the right to be treated as a prisoner of
war in case of capture was triggered only if the journalist had specific
authorization to follow the armed forces. Journalists on the battlefield
thus were urged to carry identity cards, issued by the authorizing army,
in order to create a presumption of protection. A further refinement of
international humanitarian law regarding journalists came with the
adoption of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949-Article
4(A)(4) clearly accorded "war correspondents" the status of prisoners of
war upon capture.38
In the 1970s, the United Nations, realizing that many journalists report
from conflict areas without specific authorization from one of the parties
to the conflict, commissioned a draft convention for the protection of
journalists on dangerous missions. 39 The draft version of Article 79 of
the Protocol Additional (No. I) to the Geneva Conventions 40 essentially

Individuals who follow an army without directly belonging to it, such as
newspaper correspondents and reporters, ... who fall into the enemy's hands,
and whom the latter thinks expedient to detain, have a right to be treated as
prisoners of war, provided they are in possession of a certificate from the
military authorities of the army they were accompanying.
37. Convention between the United States of America and Other Powers, Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, 2 Bevans 932.
Article 81 provides that:
Individuals who follow armed forces without directly belonging thereto, such
as newspaper correspondents and reporters... who fall into the enemy's hands
and whom the latter think expedient to detain, shall be entitled to be treated as
prisoners of war, provided they are in possession of a certificate from the
military authorities of the armed forces which they were accompanying.
38. Convention (No. III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. Article 4(A)(4) designates "war correspondents"
as a distinct category of persons who are to be considered prisoners of war and reads:
Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being
members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war
correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of
services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that
they have received authorization from the armed forces which they
accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity
card ....
39. G.A. Res. 2673 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 1922d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2673 (XXV) (1971) (directing the Economic and Social Council and, through it,
the Human Rights Commission to draft the convention). The resolution states that
journalists have an important role in conveying complete information about armed
conflicts and, because of their importance, a new humanitarian instrument is needed to
protect their interests.
40. Protocol 1,supra note 18, at art. 79.

recognized journalists not accredited to an armed force as civilians.4 '
The term "journalist" in the context of Article 79 was interpreted broadly
and included "any correspondent, reporter, photographer, and their
technical film, radio, and television assistants who are ordinarily
engaged in any of these activities as their principal occupation. ' 2 The
draft protocol required journalists to carry an identity card, issued by the
journalist's home country, attesting that the bearer is a journalist, as well
as an arm-band "bearing a distinctive emblem, a large black P on a
golden disk, in such a way as to be visible at a distance. ' 3 This gave rise
to a spirited debate over the myriad of practical and logistical problems
of issuing an identity card, such as whether journalists must indicate
their religion and what language should be used on the cards. Concerns
were raised about whether such blatant identification would make
journalists targets and threaten civilian populations. Another contentious
proposal was that all accreditation be processed through an international
professional committee set up under the Convention-a condition that
journalists warned would grant too much power to an international
authority to determine who is and who is not a journalist. 44
41. The Commentaries to Article 79 explain that the provision does not create new
law, but instead "clarifies and reaffirms the law in force regarding persons exercising the
functions of a journalist in an area of armed conflict without being an accredited
correspondent in the sense of Article 4(A)(4) of the Third Convention." In sum, Article
79 recognizes two categories of journalists that may be operating in a conflict area:
journalists accredited to the armed forces and those who are not. If captured, the former
would be prisoners of war, while the latter would be civilians. CLAUDE PILLOUD, ET
AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 920-21 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
A recent example of journalists who probably would be considered "war correspondents"
under Article 4(A)(4) are those who participated in the Pentagon's journalist embed
program in Iraq. Press Release, U.S. Secretary of State, Public Affairs Guidance on
Embedding Media during Possible Future Operations / Deployments in the U.S. Central
Commands Area of Responsibility (Feb. 3, 2002), available at http://www. defenselink.mil/
news/Feb2003/d20030228pag.pdf. Under this program, journalists are required to receive
authorization from the Pentagon to accompany U.S. troops, although there are no official
provisions for the issuance of an identity card. Journalists not accredited by the U.S.
military would appear to fall under Article 79. Interestingly, during Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm, the British army required media members to take an oath of
office, wear military uniforms, and accept long-term assignments to military units in
exchange for battlefield access. See Christopher Walker, Strong-arm Tactics Used to
Curb War Reporting, THE TIMES (London), Feb. 8, 1991, at 1.
42. PILLOUD, supra note 41, at 921 (internal citations omitted).
43. The idea of requiring journalists to register, bear ID cards, and don the black
and gold armband was first described in Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Protectionof
JournalistsEngaged in Dangerous Missions in Areas of Armed Conflicts: Report of the
U.N. Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Provisional Agenda 52(b), U.N. Doc.
U.N. Doc. A/8371 (1971). See also PILLOUD, supra note 41, at 919 (describing the
armband as being a "protective emblem clearly visible from a distance in the shape of a
bright orange armlet with two black triangles").
44. Numerous organizations and individuals were asked by the U.N. to weigh in
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Ultimately the draft version of Article 79 was made law, though the
plan for armbands was dropped and the identity card was made optional.
The provision's clear designation of journalists-not falling under
Article 4(A)(4)'s protections for "war correspondents"-as civilians has
since been ratified by 162 countries.45
B. Journalistsin U.S. Law
There are no nationwide, uniform standards in the United States for
defining who is a journalist, a question that generally comes up when an
individual seeks to invoke journalistic testimonial privilege.46 Both
Congress and federal courts have steered clear of defiming the term,
instead leaving it to state legislatures, agencies, and governmental
organizations to create their own guidelines and policies.4 7 Many federal
on the subject of creating a protected category for journalists. UNESCO submitted a
report-"Voix multiples, un seul monde"-which described resistance from the
journalistic community to creating any sort of international accreditation. This report is
described in Hans-Peter Gasser, The Protection of Journalists Engaged in Dangerous
ProfessionalMissions, 232 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 3 (1983). In an earlier report
by Claude Pilloud, Protection of Journalists on Dangerous Missions in Armed Conflict
Zones, 118 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 3 (1971), the ICRC predicted general resistance
in the international community to establishing "privileged categories" of people among
the civilian population. In Brdanin, prosecutors argued just this point, stating that
giving Randal a qualified privilege not to testify would "give [journalists] a unique status
not granted to any other member of the public. And journalists are no more than that.
They have a job, but they are just members of the public." Transcript of Proceedings at
5410, Brdanin Trial Chamber Opinion III, supra note 13. There are no minutes of the
discussions of the ad hoc working group that was set up to draft Article 79. There are
some brief Diplomatic Conference texts referring to Article 79 in 4 PROTECTION OF WAR
VICTIMS: PROTOCOL I TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS 132, 135 (Howard S. Levie
ed., 1981). U.S. and Canadian representatives submitted statements that requiring
journalists to wear any kind of distinctive insignia would endanger reporters and the
civilian populations they work among. Gasser, supra note 44.
45. See Protocol I, supra note 18, at art. 79; Int'l Humanitarian Law, supra note
18.
46. The bulk of judicial discussion over "who" is a journalist has taken place in the
United States within the context of federal agency guidelines and state laws. See infra
notes 49, 50, 51, and 52. There is a dearth of scholarship on how governments and
courts in Europe define journalists-perhaps because the concept of a journalist's
testimonial privilege is virtually unique to the United States. See THE REPORTERS COMM.
FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, THE REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE COMPENDIUM (Gregg P. Leslie

et. al. eds., 2002). In a survey of cases before the European Court of Human Rights that
addressed the rights of journalists within the context of Article 10, none has addressed
the question of "who" is a journalist.
47. In 2005, two bills were introduced to create a federal reporter's privilege. See
infra note 48.
Justice Byron White expressed the High Court's reluctance to define journalists in his

administrative agencies have promulgated regulations for dealing with
the media, which vary widely in their breadth and inclusiveness.48 Some
majority opinion in Branzburg. See Branzburg, supra note 3. There is scant federal
litigation on this issue, however the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia twice has refused to examine the definition of "journalist" established by
Congressional news galleries. See Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents'
Ass'n, 515 F.2d 1341, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (stating that Congressional Press Gallery's
refusal to grant a non-profit consumer periodical access to the "Periodical Press Galleries
of the Congress" presents a nonjusticiable issue because it involved a challenge to acts
"within the sphere of legislative power committed to the Congress and the legislative
immunity granted by the Constitution"); Schreibman v. Holmes, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12584, * 1-3, 5, 6, 7 n.6 (D.D.C. 1997) (refusing to review denial of credentials for editor
(and sole employee) of Federal Information News Syndicate, a free news service that
reports on federal legislation and governmental policies, because it was a nonjusticiable
question). See also In re GrandJury Subpoenas, No. 01-20745 (5th Cir. Aug. 17, 2001)
(unpublished) (per curiam). In that case, a freelance writer, Vanessa Leggett, was
slapped with a federal subpoena for interview notes she collected during research for a
book on a man sentenced to death in Texas for murder. While the U.S. Justice
Department is supposed to approve all subpoenas to reporters, it did not get involved in
the Leggett case because, under Justice Department guidelines, an unpublished author is
not a journalist. Prosecutors maintained that Leggett, who had never published a book or
any news articles, was not entitled to invoke a journalist's privilege. Leggett, who spent
168 days in prison resisting the subpoena, argued that she was a journalist merely
because she possessed an "intent to publish." In denying her appeal of the subpoena, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noticeably did not address the issue of whether Leggett
was a journalist. See also Julie Hinden, Who Counts As a Journalistfor First Amendment
Purposes?, Jan. 10, 2002, available at http://us.cnn.com/2002/LAW/01/columns/fl.hilden.
journalists (last visited Jan. 20, 2005). Leggett was released when the grand jury panel
before which she was supposed to testify expired.
48. For example, the U.S. Department of Justice has several regulations regarding
the media, see e.g. 28 C.F.R. 50.10, supra note 20, but does not expressly define which
individuals and entities are considered media. By comparison, the National Capital
Planning Commission has an extensive definition of media in its Freedom of Information
Act provisions, 1 C.F.R. 456.3 (2003):
Any person actively gathering news for an entity that is organized and operated
to publish or broadcast news to the public. The term "news" means information
that is about current events or that would be of current interest to the public.
Examples of news media entities include television or radio stations broadcasting to
the public at large, and publishers of periodicals (but only in those instances
when they can qualify as disseminators of "news") who make their products
available for purchase or subscription by the general public. In the case of
"freelance" journalists, they may be regarded as working for a news organization if
they can demonstrate a solid basis for expecting publication through that
organization, even though not actually employed by it. A request for records
supporting the news dissemination function of the requester shall not be
considered to be a request that is for a commercial use.
In early 2005, two bills were introduced to create a federal reporter's privilege. The Free
Flow of Information Act of 2005, sponsored in the Senate by Sen. Richard Lugar (R.Ind.), and in the U.S. House of Representatives by Rep. Mike Pence (R.-Ind.) and Rep.
Rick Boucher (D.-Va.) would cover persons working for traditional media outlets (including
newspapers, magazines, radio, television and cable). S.340, 109th Cong. (2005) and
H.R. 581, 109th Cong. (2005). The second bill, the Free Speech Protection Act of 2005,
sponsored by Sen. Christopher Dodd, D-Conn., would extend the privilege to a much
broader category of journalists. The proposed law would cover, "[A] person who-[A]
engages in the gathering of news or information; and [B] has the intent, at the beginning
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of the most useful descriptions of journalists can be found in state reporter
shield laws, which set out testimonial privileges for journalists.49 Likewise,
some state courts have also recognized a fairly wide field of potential
of the process of gathering news or information, to disseminate the news or information
to the public." S. 369, 109th Cong. (2005).
49. There is no national reporters' shield law. One of the most thorough state
shield laws is New York's, which reads in pertinent part:
(1) "Newspaper" shall mean a paper that is printed and distributed ordinarily
not less frequently than once a week, and has done so for at least one year,
and that contains news, articles of opinion (as editorials), features,
advertising, or other matter regarded as of current interest, has a paid
circulation and has been entered at United States post-office as secondclass matter.
(2) "Magazine" shall mean a publication containing news which is published
and distributed periodically, and has done so for at least one year, has a
paid circulation and has been entered at a United States post-office as
second-class matter.
(3) 'News agency" shall mean a commercial organization that collects and
supplies news to subscribing newspapers, magazines, periodicals, and news
broadcasters.
(4) "Press association" shall mean an association of newspapers and/or
magazines formed to gather and distribute news to its members.
(5) "Wire service" shall mean a news agency that sends out syndicated news
copy by wire to subscribing newspapers, magazines, periodicals, or news
broadcasters.
(6) "Professional journalist" shall mean one who, for gain or livelihood, is
engaged in gathering, preparing, collecting, writing, editing, filming, taping
or photographing of news intended for a newspaper, magazine, news
agency, press association or wire service or other professional medium or
agency which has as one of its regular functions the processing and
researching of news intended for dissemination to the public; such person
shall be someone performing said function either as a regular employee or
as one otherwise professionally affiliated for gain or livelihood with such
medium of communication.
(7) "Newscaster" shall mean a person who, for gain or livelihood, is engaged
in analyzing, commenting on or broadcasting, news by radio or television
transmission.
(8) "News" shall mean written, oral, pictorial photographic, or electronically
recorded information or communication concerning local, national or
worldwide events or other matters of public concern or public interest or
affecting the public welfare.
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (2003).

By way of contrast is California's statute, which applies to a "publisher, editor,
reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or
other periodical publication, or by a press association or wire service," or "a radio or
television news reporter or other person connected with or employed by a radio or
television station." CAL. EviD. CODE § 1070 (Deering 2004). California courts have held that
a freelancer is not sufficiently "connected" to benefit from the privilege, unless they have
a contractual agreement with a specific publisher. In re Van Ness, 8 Med. L. Rptr. 2563
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1982).

227

journalist privilege claimants. Courts have allowed employers,5 0 academics, 5 1
and bloggers 2 to claim the privilege.
IV. LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR A QUALIFIED TESTIMONIAL
PRIVILEGE FOR JOURNALISTS

Precedent for a qualified testimonial privilege for journalists in the
ICC lies not only in the Brdjanin case, but may also be drawn from
norms of freedom of expression and analogies to privileges extended to
other professions which demand that their practitioners keep confidences
and remain outside the judicial process.
A. European Law
54
53
In the 1996 case of Goodwin v. United Kingdom, the ECHR
addressed the significance of allowing journalists to protect certain kinds
of information from courts. The case involved confidential documents
that were provided to William Goodwin, a staff writer for The Engineer,
a London-based weekly magazine covering science and technology. The
documents referred to the financial travails of Tetra, Ltd., a U.K. company
that produces laboratory equipment. A judge ordered, on an application
by the company, that the reporter disclose the source's identity so the

50. Bauer v. Brown, 11 Med. L. Rptr. 2168 (W.D. Va. 1985). InBauer,the plaintiff, a
former teacher pursuing a section 1983 claimagainst several former colleagues,
subpoenaed a reporter to testify and to produce documents relating to interviews with the
defendants. The reporter-who had since resigned his job as a journalist-agreed to
testify, but the documentation was in the possession of the newspaper, which asserted the
privilege. The district court quashed the subpoena on other grounds, but left open the
question of the publisher's standing.
51. In re GrandJury Subpoena, 750 F.2d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 1984). A PhD candidate,
who witnessed a suspicious fire while collecting information for his dissertation, may
argue on remand that the information is covered by a qualified privilege for scholars
when "a serious academic inquiry is undertaken pursuant to a considered research plan in
which the need for confidentiality is tangibly related to the accuracy or completeness of
the study."
52. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 186 F.R.D. 236, 244 (D.D.C. 1999). In his defamation
lawsuit against Internet blogger Matt Drudge, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate
that he had exhausted every reasonable alternative source for the information. The
Blumenthal court did not question whether Drudge was a journalist.
53. Goodwin, supranote 3.
54. Established in 1953, the ECHR serves as a type of appellate court for European
legal systems, and its decisions are binding on the forty-five member states in the
Council of Europe. Member states are bound to uphold their obligations under the
European Convention on Human Rights. If an individual believes their rights have been
violated, and they have exhausted domestic remedies, they can take their case to the
ECHR. Responsibility for supervising the execution of judgments lies with the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. See European Ct. of Human Rights,
Historical Background, Organization and Procedure at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/
EDocs/HistoricalBackground.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
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company could sue for damages and recovery of the documents. Relying
on the United Kingdom's shield law, 55 Goodwin appealed to the Court
of Appeal, contending that disclosing the notes of his discussions with
his source were not necessary "in the interests of justice" and that the
public interest in publication outweighed the interest in preserving
confidentiality.56 Goodwin lost two rounds of appeals before the Court
of Appeal and the House of Lords. 7
Goodwin next turned to the ECHR, claiming that the court's order
requiring him to reveal the identity of his source violated his right to
freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, which prohibits restrictions on free expression-including
the disclosure of information given in confidence-unless the state can
prove the action is "necessary in a democratic society. 58 The ECHR agreed
that the U.K.'s court order was in pursuit of a legitimate aim, namely to
protect Tetra's rights, but concluded that the action was not "necessary
in a democratic society." Specifically, the ECHR determined that Tetra's
interests in unmasking the disloyal employee did not outweigh the "vital
public interest" in the protection of a journalist's source.5 9 The court
emphasized that the question of whether to compel a reporter to reveal
information given to him by a source could not be determined by the
degree of public interest in the information. The court wrote: "A source
may provide information of little value one day and of great value the
next; what mattered was that the relationship between the journalist and
the source was generating the kind of information which had legitimate
60
news potential.
The court stated that withholding such a privilege might deter sources
from speaking to the press about matters of public interest and thus
hobble the press' "vital public-watchdog role."'6 1 The court further noted
55. Section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 provides:
No court may require a person to disclose, nor is a person guilty of contempt of
court for refusing to disclose the source of information contained in the
publication for which he is responsible, unless it be established to the
satisfaction of the court that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice or
national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime.
Contempt of Court Act, 1981, c. 10 (Eng.).
56. Goodwin, supra note 3, 17.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. 18.
See 1950 Convention on Human Rights, supra note 19.
Goodwin, supra note 3, 45.
Id. 37.
Id. 39.

that allowing journalists to keep the confidentiality of their sources is a
vital element of press freedom and has been recognized by numerous
international instruments.6 2
While Goodwin clearly establishes a reporter's prerogative to protect
sources under European human rights law, its recognition of the value of
relationships between journalists and their sources, and the importance
of journalism to the public, is the foundation of a broader concept of
qualified journalistic privilege. In short, journalists serve a critical role
in society by disseminating information to the public. Fulfillment of these
obligations requires that journalists be allowed to establish and foster
relationships with sources, confidential or not, without the threat that this
relationship will be used for other purposes. The decision recognizes
that when people speak to and confide in journalists, they generally do
so with the expectation that the information will end up as news, not as
evidence in a trial. While Goodwin deals solely with the issue of confidential
sources, its logic arguably can be extended to non-confidential information
collected by journalists, both reported and unreported. The argument is
that turning journalists into "investigators" for the courts obliterates the
trust between journalists and their sources of information and thwarts the
journalist from fulfilling his or her "public-watchdog role."
B. U.S. Law
There is no national reporter's shield law in the United States.63
62. The court cites as examples of international instruments recognizing protection
of journalistic sources: Resolution on Journalistic Freedoms and Human Rights,
European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy, 4th Conf. (1994); and Resolution on
the Confidentiality of Journalists' Sources and the Right of Civil Servants to Disclose
Information, 1994 O.J. (C 44) 34. See also Rights of Journalistsnot to Disclose their
Sources of Information, Eur. Cmte. of Ministers, 701 mtg., Rec. No. R (2000) 7 (2000).
The latter is the COE's attempt to reinforce the principles articulated by the ECHR in the
Goodwin case and to harmonize European municipal law on journalist's privilege.
63. See supra note 48. Sen. Sen. Dodd's Free Speech Protection Act of 2005 sets
out a three-pronged test that must be met by a Federal entity seeking to compel disclosure of
news or information. The seeking party must show "by clear and convincing evidence
that: 1) the news or information is critical or necessary to the resolution of a significant
legal issue before an entity of the judicial, legislative, or administrative branch of the
Federal Government that has the power to issue a subpoena; (2) the news or information
could not be obtained by alternative means; and (3) there is an overriding public interest
in the disclosure." S.369, 109th Cong. (2005). The Free Flow of Information Act of 2005
requires a showing by "clear and convincing evidence" that the seeking party has
"unsuccessfully attempted" to acquire the information from another source. If the
information is being sought for a criminal investigation or prosecution, there must be a
showing that a crime has occurred and the information is "essential" to the investigation,
prosecution, or defense. In a matter other than a criminal investigation or prosecution,
the information must be shown to be "essential to a dispositive issue of substantial
importance to that matter." S.340, 109th Cong. (2005) and H.R. 581, 109th Cong. (2005).
See also 28 CFR § 50.10, infra note 21. Some commentators argue the Justice
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Federal courts, however, have recognized a qualified privilege for journalists
from being compelled to testify about their news-gathering, and thirtyone states and the District of Columbia have enacted reporter's shield
laws.64 The laws differ in their scope of protection,65 but in general,
reporters may not ignore attempts to compel their testimony. Rather,
they must make an appearance or motion to quash the subpoena by
proffering a basis for their objection to disclosure.
The wellspring of a First Amendment-based qualified journalist's66
privilege is Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Branzburgv. Hayes.
The journalists in Branzburg were held in contempt for failing to appear
before grand juries investigating criminal conduct that the reporters had
learned of through their reporting. In a 5-4 decision, the Court refused
to recognize an absolute privilege for journalists,

67

but Justice Powell's

concurring opinion offered a limited qualified privilege for information
"remote and tenuous" to the subject of the investigation or when the

Department regulation has operated as an informal shield law when the government
seeks to compel a journalist's testimony. See Lystad, supra note 35, at 133-34.
64. The states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Rhode
Island, and Tennessee. See WENDY TANNENBAUM, THE REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS, AGENTS OF DISCOVERY: A REPORT ON THE INCIDENCE OF SUBPOENAS SERVED
ON THE NEWS MEDIA IN 2001 (Lucy A. Dalglish & Gregg P. Leslie eds., 2002); and
REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE COMPENDIUM, supra note 46.

65. All shield laws cover information given to a reporter in confidence. Eighteen
states and the District of Columbia provide some protection for journalists' nonconfidential information, yet even in these states, protection for non-confidential information
is not uniform. See Anthony L. Fargo, The Journalist'sPrivilegefor Nonconfidential
Information in States with Shield Laws, 4 COMM. L. POL'Y 325, 349 (1999). See also
Lystad, supra note 35. The authors describe three general categories of shield laws in
the United States: (1) "absolutist" laws, enacted before 1950, that provide full protection
for journalists from testifying before legal or governmental proceedings, (2) "transitional"
statutes, passed directly before and after the Branzburg decision, that require a finding
that compelling the reporter to name her sources (and in some cases, protection is
extended to unpublished information) is essential to the public interest or to prevent
injustice, and (3) "modem era" laws, passed in the 1990s, which grant the privilege to
keep confidential both sources and information after a finding that the information
sought is essential to the underlying proceeding and cannot be obtained elsewhere, and
clearly classifies as unprivileged any information gleaned as an eyewitness to criminal or
tortuous conduct.
66. Branzburg, supra note 3. This is the only case where the U.S. Supreme Court
has ruled directly on the issue of testimonial privilege for journalists.
67. Id. at 693. Indeed, the court was skeptical that forcing reporters to testify
would actually hinder their access to sources.

testimony would compromise a "confidential
source relationship without
68
legitimate need of law enforcement.,
In the thirty years since Branzburg,federal courts addressing the issue
of journalists' privilege have focused on Powell's concurrence. Today,
almost all circuits recognize a qualified privilege against compelling
journalists to disclose information learned through their reporting-even
when non-confidential material is involved. 69 Again, as in the ECHR's
decision in Goodwin, the underlying rationale for recognizing a qualified
privilege for journalists is that reporters must not be viewed as being
potential agents of the courts, lest they lose their status as impartial
observers and, in turn, their ability to provide information to the public.7 °
C. PrivilegesRecognized by the ICTY and the ICC
In considering a privilege for journalists, it is instructive to consider
the existing testimonial privileges recognized by the ICTY and the ICC,
all of which are grounded in the belief that the independence of certain
professionals is critical to their work. The ICTY has a single category of
68. Id.at 710.
69. Nonconfidential information includes things such as the reporter's observations, as
well as notes, photographs, and videotapes that were not used because of editorial
decisions. See e.g., Schoen v. Schoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that
almost all federal courts recognize a qualified privilege for journalists to resist compelled
discovery). Examples of courts applying the privilege to protect nonconfidential
material include: Church of Scientology International v. Daniels, 992 F.2d 1329, 1335
(4th Cir. 1993) (affirming a district court's refusal to compel discovery of nonconfidential
material from an editorial meeting at USA Today); U.S. v. LaRouche Campaign, 841
F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st Cir. 1988) ("[W]e discern a lurking and subtle threat to journalists
and their employers if disclosure of outtakes, notes, and other unused information, even
if non-confidential, becomes routine and casually... compelled."); and Loadholz v.
Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 1975) ("The compelled production of a
reporter's resource materials is equally as invidious as the compelled disclosure of his
confidential information."). But see McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
In McKevitt, U.S. District Judge Richard Posner argues that federal circuit courts have
stretched the import of Branzburg, noting that the "approaches that these decisions take
to the issue of privilege can certainly be questioned." See also In re: GrandJury Subpoena,
No. 04-3138, slip op. at 15 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 15, 2005). A three judge panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected an attempt by New York Times
reporter Judith Miller and Time magazine reporter Matthew Cooper to refuse to testify
before a federal grand jury investigating the leak of an undercover CIA operative's
identity to reporters. In refusing to adopt a broad reading of Branzburg, Judge David B.
Sentelle wrote for the court that, at least in cases of criminal grand juries, there is no
evidence that Justice Powell's concurrence intended to "elevate the journalistic class
above the rest."
70. For a discussion of the early debate over journalists' privilege in the United
States, which was largely sparked by efforts by U.S. Attorneys and local district
attorneys investigating anti-war and social activist groups in the 1960s and 1970s, see
Karl H. Schmid, Journalist'sPrivilegein CriminalProceedings:An Analysis of United
States Courts of Appeals' Decisions from 1973 to 1999, 39 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 1441,
1449-51 (2002).
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codified privilege, which is for attomey-client communications.71 In
contrast, the ICC has several codified privileges in its rules of evidence,
including protections for ICRC employees, as well as members of certain
professions, including lawyers, doctors, and priests.72 A catch-all provision
covers privileged communications in other professions, so long as the
court determines that: (1) the communications were made in the course
of a confidential relationship producing a reasonable expectation of
privacy and non-disclosure, (2) that confidentiality is essential to the
nature and type of relationship between the person and the confidant,
and (3) that the recognition73of the privilege would further the objectives
of the statute and the rules.

Members of the ICRC receive, by far, the clearest and most solid
privilege from both the ICTY and the ICC. The privilege was first
recognized by the ICTY in Prosecutorv. Simic-the only case other than
Brdjanin where the ICTY considered the issue of testimonial privilege.7 4
In that case, the ICTY prosecutor sought to call an ICRC employee as a
witness to testify about information he had obtained during visits to
detention centers. This employee voluntarily had approached the ICTY
with his information and was willing to testify; however the ICRC
objected and was granted permission by the trial court to appear as
Amicus Curiae.75 In its submission to the court, the ICRC argued that its
employees may be denied access to persons protected by the Geneva
Conventions if there was a chance that they could be called to testify in
criminal proceedings.76 The prosecution countered by arguing that the
ICRC did not, as a matter of law, enjoy an immunity or privilege
77
allowing it to unilaterally prevent its employees from testifying.
In its decision, the ICTY trial panel analyzed whether ICRC members
should enjoy a "common law" testimonial privilege before the panel by
examining three questions: (1) whether the ICRC has a confidentiality
interest under conventional or customary international law that would
entitle it to prevent disclosure of information; (2) if there is such an
71. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 5, 97.
72. Id. 973.
73. Id.
74. Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9-PT (ICTY Trial Chamber July 27, 1999).
3, 7, 34. The court noted that the issue of admissibility of the testimony
75. Id.
of a witness may involve third party interests. See also Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No.
IT-95-9-PT (ICTY Trial Chamber Mar. 16, 1999).

76.
77.

Id. 4.
Id.

interest, whether it should be balanced against the need for disclosure in
the interests of justice, on a case-by-case basis; and (3) whether protective
measures exist that could adequately protect this interest and meet the
ICRC's concerns. 78 In addressing the first question, the court noted that
the ICRC, an independent humanitarian organization centered around
the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence, occupies a
"special status" in international law since its existence is "directly
derived" from the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols. 79 The
court emphasized that in order to carry out its mandate, the ICRC
required relationships of trust and confidence with various parties to an
armed conflict. 80 Further, the court noted that since World War II, the
ICRC had not allowed its employees to testify before courts without
securing permission from ICRC management. Then, having determined
that the ICRC has "a confidentiality interest and a claim to non-disclosure of
this information" under customary international law, the court concluded
that discussion of any balancing of interests or the feasibility of other
protective measures was precluded. 81 Thus, the ICTY established a binding
recognition of the customary legal right of the ICRC not to disclose
information before the tribunal.
Less than a year later, the holding of Simic was adopted and codified
in the ICC's Rule 73. Under the rule, ICRC members are not required to
reveal "any information, documents or other evidence which it came into
the possession of in the course, or as a consequence, of the performance
by the ICRC of its functions." If a court decides that certain information
is "of great importance to a particular case," it must initiate consultations
between the court and the ICRC to "resolve the matter by cooperative
means.,,82
V. MORAL

DILEMMAS

The question of whether a journalist should take the stand in a
criminal trial generally centers around two related issues, both of which
focus on the affirmative duty to assist judicial bodies to reach a just
result. The first is the importance of preventing criminals from impunity. It
asks whether a journalist's obligation to testify against those who
commit war crimes surpasses their duty to collect and report the news.
The second is protecting individuals from suffering a miscarriage of
justice. Does a journalist who possesses exculpatory or mitigating evidence
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. 44.
Id. 46.
Id. 65-68.
Id. 76-80.
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 5,

73.
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when this information could be critical to
have a duty to come forward
83
defense?
an individual's
There are several examples that illustrate the former situation. To
date, two British journalists have taken the stand at ICTY trials. Ed
Vulliamy, a journalist with the London Observer and one of the most
vocal critics of Jonathan Randal's stance against appearing before
international tribunals, testified before the ICTY against Serbian leader
Milan Kovacevic, the first man ever to be accused of genocide by an
international court. In an editorial, Vulliamy warned that establishing a
testimonial privilege for journalists would threaten the efficacy of the
ICC. "I believe there are times in history-as any good Swiss banker
will tell you-that neutrality is not neutral but complicit in the crime,"
he wrote. "My belief is that we must do our professional duty to our
papers and public, and our moral and legal duty to this new enterprise.
Why should journalists of all people-whose information will be of such
84
value--perch loffily above the due process of law?" The second journalist,
BBC reporter Jacky Rowland, testified against Yugoslav President
Slobodan Milosevic, who is currently charged with genocide and crimes
against humanity. "I don't buy the argument that testifying will make our
work in wars more dangerous or difficult than it already is," Rowland
told The New York Times after testifying about the scores of dead inmates
85
"A journalist is a
she saw in 1999 at the Dubrava prison in Kosovo.
witness. We
bearing
of
witness, and coming to the court is an extension
citizens. ' 86
other
of
duties
moral
the
from
exempt
beings,
are not superior
In justifying her decision to take the stand, Rowland emphasized she had
not testified about any information from confidential sources and that the
87
information in her answers was already in the public domain.

83. To put these arguments in the context of the U.S. judicial system, prosecutors
have argued that reporters should be treated as citizens, who are obligated by law to
provide relevant evidence concerning the commission of a crime. A criminal defendant
may argue that when a reporter possesses evidence critical to their defense, the Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial outweighs any First Amendment right of the reporter.
Civil litigants may make a related argument, not rooted in the Constitution, but on the
basis that they are entitled to evidence relevant to their case.
84. Ed Vulliamy, Comment: An Obligation to the Truth: Journalists should be
Prepared to Risk their Safety and Testify at the International Criminal Court, THE
OBSERVER [London], May 16, 2002, at 30.

85. Marlise Simons, Reporter Testifies in Milosevic Case, Fueling Debate on
Witnesses, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 29, 2002, at A7.
86. Id.
87. Id.

In an example of the latter justification for testifying, former BBC
correspondent Martin Bell took the stand to testify in defense of Tihomir
Blaskic, head of the Croatian defense force in central Bosnia during the
Bosnian war who was accused of helping to plan the systemic persecution
of Bosnian Muslims in 1993. Bell defended his decision to testify by
explaining that journalists "are a citizen first and a journalist second.... If
I hadn't testified in [Blaskic's] defense I would have blamed myself for
not having tried to save him." Blaskic eventually was found guilty by
the ICTY and sentenced to forty-five years in prison.
Notably, there appears to be a distinct divide between European and
American journalists as to whether reporters should testify for or against
defendants in court. Such generalizations, of course, risk oversimplifying
the issue. Nonetheless, the sentiment articulated by Vullimany, Rowland,
and Bell-that a journalist's work is secondary to their responsibilities
as a citizen-is certainly not the prevailing view of the American media,
which led the charge as Amici Curiae in the Brdjanin case.88 American
reporters and news outlets-protected by the First Amendment, which
guarantees far greater press freedoms than are recognized elsewhere in
the world--clearly view themselves as being a distinct counter-weight to
other branches of government. While this perspective may be idealistic,
and to some extent self-serving, it is nonetheless the case that U.S.
media in general find anathema the prospect of involvement in judicial
proceedings. Reporters and news organizations routinely resist subpoenas
and tirelessly lobby legislatures and argue to courts that they should be
protected from involvement in judicial proceedings, save perhaps an
extremely compelling need that cannot be met by another alternative.
Randal's position in the Brdjanin case is an example of how extreme
this resistance to journalistic involvement in judicial proceedings can
be. 89 In explaining his decision to fight the ICTY trial court's subpoena,
Randal explained later that it was unrealistic to expect journalists to testify
without compromising their roles as neutral observers. "We talk to the bad
guys, we talk to the good guys and we try to inform the public," he said.
Our job is not to be moralists. Our job is to try to explain very complicated and
quite often very nasty violent situations. ... [T]o get the news, one has to gain
the confidence of the people who are doing the fighting. And if those people
feel that the first thing a correspondent is going to do is testify before a war
crimes tribunal, one of two things are very likely to happen. Either the
correspondent will not be able to talk to anybody or he'll be killed. 90

88. The majority of amici were U.S. news organizations or U.S.-based media interest
groups. They were represented by U.S. attorney Floyd Abrams of Cahill, Gordon & Reindel.
89. See discussion in Part I of the Brdjanin case. The ICTY rejected Randal's
proposed test for compelling journalist's testimony as an impermissible absolute privilege.
90. Talk of the Nation: Interview with Jonathan Randal (National Public Radio,
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It is noteworthy that when presented with exactly the same situationtestifying about information not involving confidential sources and already
made public-Rowland and Randal come down on exactly opposite
sides.
There is an argument that forcing Randal to merely confirm what he'd
already reported publicly would not threaten confidences, his safety, or
his standing as an objective reporter. In response, Randal would argue
that the overriding concern is of descending a slippery slope where
journalists are routinely haled before courts without a demonstration that
their presence is of a highly compelling need. The argument is that the
ebbing away-no matter how seemingly innocuous--of a journalist's
preferred position of being entirely outside the judicial process can, in
the long-run, threaten the journalist's role as neutral observer and
perhaps put members of the profession in danger.
While the ICTY did not totally agree with Randal's argument, it did
tacitly agree that routinely seeking journalists' testimony in international
1
tribunals could hinder their effectiveness. 9 In its decision in Brdjanin,
with the countervailing
concerns
the ICTY attempted to balance Randal's
justice and providing
of
pursuit
the
issues of assisting prosecutors in
of their innocence.
evidence
dispositive
defendants with a tool to compel
evidence
decision-that
Brdjanin
the
The two-part test articulated in
issue in
core
a
determining
in
value
sought be of "direct and important
92-- does an
elsewhere"
obtained
be
the case" and "cannot reasonably
adequate job of sketching out the rough parameters of a testimonial
privilege for journalists working in conflict areas. An effective ICC rule
for journalists' privilege, however, must clearly articulate to whom it
will apply and must provide concrete benchmarks for determining when
a journalist may be compelled to testify and the steps necessary to
compel that testimony.
VI. A PROPOSED CODIFIED RULE FOR THE ICC

Rule 73 of the ICC's "Rules of Procedure and Evidence" should be
amended to codify and clarify the testimonial protection93 for war
Such a
correspondents recognized by the ICTY in the Brdjanin case.
Dec. 12, 2002).
91. See supranote 27.
92. Supra note 1.
93. Under Article 51 of the Rome Statute, see supra note 4, amendments to the
ICC's Rules of Procedure and Evidence may be proposed by any state party to the
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codification will assist and protect journalists working in conflict areas
and guide prosecutors, defendants, and courts in subsequent proceedings.
An argument could be made that journalists are protected under
subsections two and three of Rule 73--catch-all provisions that make
communications made in the context of a class of professional or other
confidential relationships privileged. 94 Journalists, however, are not explicitly
covered by the provisions-reporter-source is not included in the list of
professional relationships clearly covered under subsection two (i.e.,
communications between persons and their legal counsel, doctor, or
clergy). Furthermore, unlike the enumerated professional relationships in
Rule 73's subsection three-all of which have generally accepted
professional guidelines regarding confidential communications that are
recognized in rules of evidence around the world-there is still
significant international debate regarding whether such a privilege exists for
journalists. Thus, a journalist may have difficulty arguing that their
communications fall under the rule. Rule 73 should incorporate the
important principle recognized by the Brdjanin court-that journalists
presumptively are protected from testifying based upon their status as
journalists. Journalists must be able to communicate freely, without the
threat of being forced to testify, if they are to be of value in facilitating
the free flow of information.

statute, the sitting judges acting in absolute majority, or the prosecutor. New rules must
be adopted by 2/3 of state parties.
94. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 5. Subdivisions 2 and 3
read:
2. [C]ommunications made in the context of a class of a class of professional
or other confidential relationships shall be regarded as privileged, and
subsequently not subject to disclosure, unless under the same terms as in
sub-rules 1 (a) and 1 (b) [which allows disclosure when the speaker
consents, or has voluntarily disclosed the content of the communication to
a third party] if a Chamber decides in respect of that class that:
(a) Communications occurring within that class of relationship are
made in the course of a confidential relationship producing a
reasonable expectation of privacy and non-disclosure;
(b) Confidentiality is essential to the nature and type of relationship
between the person and the confidant; and
(c) Recognition of the privilege would further the objectives of the
Statute and the Rules.
3. In making a decision under sub-rule 2, the Court shall give particular regard
to recognizing as privileged those communications made in the context of
the professional relationship between a person and his or her medical
doctor, psychiatrist, psychologist or counselor, in particular those related to
or involving victims, or between persons and a member of a religious
clergy; and in the latter case, the Court shall recognize as privileged those
communications made in the context of a sacred confession where it is an
integral part of the practice of that religion.
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A.

Step 1: Articulate the Policy

The first step in codifying an amended Rule 73 is for the ICC to
clarify the policy reasons for recognizing a testimonial privilege for
journalists working in conflict areas. The value of journalism in facilitating
the free exchange of ideas and information has been discussed in
international law at length by the ICTY in the Brdjanin case and by the
ECHR in the Goodwin case. The value in the privilege is not to serve as
a personal "benefit" to journalists or a "shield" to protect their sources
from prosecution, but rather to foster and protect journalistic independence
and the process of gathering news.
B. Step 2: Define who is to Benefit from the Rule
In amending Rule 73 to include a codified protection for journalists,
the ICC must clearly define who is to be covered by the privilege. In so
doing, it should expand on the functional approach used by the ICTY in
Brdjanin. Although the Brdjanin approach provides a basis for an
amended Rule 73, its definition of who is covered by the provision is too
narrow. In Brdjanin,the ICTY specifically narrowed its holding to "war
correspondents," which it described as "individuals who, for any period
of time, report (or investigate for the purposes of reporting) from a
95
conflict zone on issues relating to the conflict." There are several problems
with this definition. First, "war correspondent" is a term of art under
96
international humanitarian law, referring specifically to a journalist
working under the specific authorization of a party to an armed conflict.
To avoid confusion and under-inclusiveness, the ICC should make clear
that this rule applies to journalists working not only under approval of
one of the parties to the armed conflict, but those who are reporting
independently. This would be done by explaining that the law applies to
"war correspondents" as used in both Article 4(A)(4) of the Third
Geneva Convention and Article 79 of Protocol I.
A second problem with the definition adopted by the ICTY in Brdjanin is
that it is directed at individuals who "report, or investigate for the purpose
of reporting." This logically suggests that a journalist is included for
protection so long as their work is reported, and it could be interpreted as

95.

Brdjanin Appeals Chamber Opinion, supra note 1, 29.

96. See Convention (No. III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra
note 38.

excluding journalists such as freelancers and book authors, who may be
working without a contract for their work and have no guarantee that
their labors will eventually result in any reported news. For the amended
Rule 73, the ICC should make clear that protection will be extended to
any individual working as a journalist for gain or livelihood and is
collecting news "intended" for use by a news outlet or in publication. If
necessary, the court can hold an evidentiary hearing on whether the
individual claiming the privilege qualifies and may consider factors such
as the individual's previous published works and efforts to secure
publication of the work now under dispute.
In addition to the above expansion of the Brdjanin holding, the
proposed rule also should include protections for individuals who are
assisting or supervising the journalist and are privy to the information
obtained during their work. This group would include editors who
supervise the reporter, as well as translators and other support staff who
facilitate the collection of news. If these individuals are not included, a
party easily could bypass the protections extended to the journalist.
C. Step 3: Define the Scope of the Privilege
The ICC should be clear that the journalistic testimonial privilege extends
not only to confidential communications between a journalist and their
source, but also to non-confidential communications that are part of a
journalist's everyday work. The rule should make clear that it is not the
information itself that is being protected, but a policy goal to protect the
journalist from being viewed as an agent of the court, the prosecution, or
the defense.
D. Step 4: Establish a Pre-TrialProcedure
Before the court is faced with potentially having to order a reporter to
testify, there should be mandatory consultations between the court, the
journalist (and her employer where applicable), and the party seeking the
disclosure (prosecution or defense). In these consultations, every effort
should be made to determine whether the matter can be resolved by
some cooperative means or by obtaining the information from another
source.
E. Step 5: Apply a Three-PartBalancing Test
In Brdjanin, the ICTY set out a two-part test for whether a reporter
should be compelled to testify. First, the prosecution must demonstrate
that the information is of "direct and important value in a core issue of
the case" and second, that the information "cannot reasonably be obtained
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elsewhere." Under the amended Rule 73, the ICC should require that the
information sought also be of "essential or vital" importance to the guilt
or innocence of the defendant. This wording adds necessary precision to
the first prong of the ICTY test. To say that something is "direct and
important to a core issue" is so ambiguous as to allow virtually anything
proffered by the prosecution or defense to be compelled.
In addition, the Brdjanin test should be revised to add that the requesting
party must demonstrate that the information cannot be obtained from any
other source. To require only a showing that the information cannot
"reasonably" be obtained elsewhere is again too lenient, particularly
since the ICTY gave no indication of what kind of efforts it would deem
reasonable. To require a reluctant journalist and a requesting party to
quibble over whether other "reasonable" efforts could be made to secure
the information elsewhere also is not an efficient way to resolve the
problem. The requesting party must be required to demonstrate to the
court that the information it seeks can be obtained from one person
alone-the journalist. Conversely, defendants would be allowed to argue
that the information is essential or vital to their innocence or guilt,
protecting their right to a fair trial, and insuring all relevant information
to their defense is introduced at trial.
Finally, the new third prong of the amended Rule 73 test should be
that the court consider the risks to the journalist, as well as other
reporters working in the region, if the journalist if forced to testify. The
court would be required to make a finding of whether, in light of the
risks to the journalist, he or she should be compelled to take the stand in
the interest of justice.
VII. CONCLUSION
The job of a journalist is to bear witness-to be the eyes of the public.
There are few times when this work is more important than in times of
armed conflict. News coverage-from the film footage of Serbian
concentration camps, to newspaper stories of massacres in Rwanda, to
investigative reports on prisoner mistreatment in Iraqi prisons-has led
to changes in countries' foreign policies, interventions on behalf of
oppressed peoples, and the investigation and prosecution of war crimes.
Certainly most journalism is not so heroic, yet the profession's value in
ensuring the world learns about events that might otherwise go
unnoticed is clear. Journalists are best able to fulfill the important role
of witness when they are able to move among and talk freely to all

parties to a conflict. To do so, they must work outside of the control of
any government, international organization, or party to a conflict. This
should mean that journalists cannot be compelled to testify before
international criminal tribunals except in extraordinary circumstances.
Consequently, the ICC should amend its rules of procedure to protect the
important role that is played in bearing witness by clearly establishing a
testimonial privilege for journalists.

